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Guidry v. State, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (June 2, 2022)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: IMPROPER JURY INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WARRANTING REVERSAL OF MURDER CONVICTION AND
REMAND ON SENTENCING FOR OTHER CHARGES
Summary
The Supreme Court of Nevada, reviewing the case de novo, considered whether the errors
committed by the prosecution at trial entitled the appellant to relief from her convictions. The
Court held that the ambiguous jury instruction on the count of second-degree murder was a
prejudicial error, warranting a reversal of the conviction. As to the charges of robbery, grand
larceny, and leaving the scene, for which the appellant was also convicted, claims of prosecutorial
misconduct and challenges to the sufficiency of evidence were not sufficient to warrant a reversal.
Given the reversal on the second-degree murder charge, however, the Court vacated the sentences
on the remaining convictions and remanded for reconsideration on the matter.
Facts and Procedural History
Ronneka Guidry was charged with and convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, grand
larceny, and leaving the scene of an accident causing great bodily injury after an interaction with
now-deceased Eduardo Osorio. The appellant and the decedent were captured on hotel surveillance
together entering a self-parking lot in an intimate fashion and moments later, according to
eyewitness testimony, Osorio could be seen jumping on Guidry’s moving vehicle, punching the
windshield, as the vehicle accelerated. Eventually, Osorio, when thrown from the vehicle, hit his
head. When Osorio died shortly after, his manner of death was deemed to be accidental, resulting
from blunt force injuries.
Police claim to have identified Guidry’s vehicle through surveillance and arrested her on
an unrelated traffic warrant. Guidry was questioned about the incident with Osorio while detained.
A warrant was issued, and a search of Guidry’s phone yielded evidence that would be admitted
against her. The evidence included photos of an $8,000 Rolex-branded watch Osorio was missing
after the incident and text transcripts showing Guidry negotiated the sale price of the watch and
ultimately shipped it pursuant to the sale.
Guidry was charged with first-degree murder and leaving the scene of the accident for
driving and accelerating the vehicle while Osorio was on the hood of it. The charges of robbery
and grand larceny were brought related to the taking and selling of Osorio’s watch. At trial, the
prosecution presented instructions to the jury that included definitions related to felony murder –
an offense not requiring a showing of malice, and that was not relevant to the facts of Guidry’s
case. After raising some clarifying questions about the instruction, the jury convicted Guidry of
second-degree murder, robbery, grand larceny, and fleeing. This appeal followed.
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Discussion
On appeal, Guidry challenged each of her convictions, arguing that jury instructions were
improper, that there was prosecutorial misconduct in the mischaracterization of evidence, that the
evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and that her dual conviction for both robbery
and grand larceny equated to double jeopardy.
On the murder conviction, Guidry argued that the prosecution presented jury instructions
in a way that lowered the standard for a finding of guilt in second-degree murder beyond what is
permissible by law. The instruction included definitions related to felony murder, which require
only reckless disregard, whereas second-degree murder requires a showing of malice beyond a
reasonable doubt. The State argued that taken as a whole, the instruction clearly communicated
the law relevant to second-degree murder. The Court reviewed the murder conviction de novo,
using the ‘plain-error’ standard since the jury instruction was unopposed to at trial.
Under a plain-error review, Guidry would need to show that there was an error, that the
error was plain or clear, and that it affected her substantial rights in a way that had prejudicial
effects.2
To determine whether the jury instruction was erroneous, the Court turned to NRS 200.0103
and NRS 200.0204, which expresses the requirements for a murder conviction. According to the
statute, a conviction for murder requires a showing of either express or implied malice. Here, the
Court noted, the instruction presented described the concept of malice but effectively relieved the
jury of the burden of finding that Guidry acted with malice as required for a second-degree murder
conviction. The instruction also included language reflecting the unintentional killing standard
under NRS 200.070(1)5. The State argued that taken as a whole, the instructions to the jury clearly
explained the requirements for each of the relevant convictions, and that the jury could have just
disregarded the irrelevant parts. The Court disagreed, citing Tanksley v. State6, noting that even a
holistic view of the instructions provided does not cure the ambiguity, since the jury could have
mistaken irrelevant parts of the instruction as a specific application of the rule.
Since the error in offering the ambiguous jury instruction was clear but unopposed at trial,
the Court introduced the requirement of prejudice under NRS 178.6027. The Court ultimately
determined that the prejudicial impact was clear since the jury had raised questions during
deliberations that indicated uncertainty as to the proper standards that should be applied in reaching
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The standard used by the Court comes from Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). The Court
also cited United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 664 (2d Cir. 2003) for their definition of plain or clear error.
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their verdict. Here, the Court noted, it was unclear whether the jury found malice or erroneously
mistook the “unintentional killing” standard as waiving the malice requirement. Therefore, the
instruction was impermissibly ambiguous to the level of impacting Guidry’s substantial rights. The
Court held that error required reversal.
Guidry also raised challenges to her remaining convictions. First, she argued that the
evidence was insufficient to convict her of grand larceny, robbery, and leaving the scene. Despite
her assertion that Oscario gave her the watch, the Court held that given the circumstances8, the
jury could have found this to be untrue beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing Grant v. State9, the
Court notes that intent to rob can be derived from circumstantial evidence.
Next Guidry argued that being convicted for both robbery and grand larceny for her
possession of a single watch violated her protection against double jeopardy. The Court, using the
Blockburger10 test for Double Jeopardy, did not agree. They explained that where there are
elements of each respective offense not held in common with the other, double jeopardy is not
implicated.11 Here, they noted, an element exclusive to the robbery is the use of force; similarly,
specific intent is an element required only for grand larceny. Thus, to convict her of both offenses
would not be a violation of her rights under the double-jeopardy prohibition.
The appellant also argued that the exclusion of the self-defense defense was prejudicial
because if delivered to the jury, would have made it impossible for her to be charged with robbery
and leaving the scene of the accident resulting in great bodily harm. The Court rejected this
argument, noting that the appellant failed to meet the burden of proving self-defense as to deem
the exclusion of the instruction clearly erroneous. First, the Court notes that it is not impossible to
find a person committed a robbery while acting in self-defense if the defensive action was a part
of “a continuous sequence of events”12. Further, the evidence did not sufficiently support the
assertion that Guidry was in real or perceived danger when she fled the scene, as required by NRS
as required by NRS 200.200(2)13. Therefore, since it is not clear that Guidry would have been
entitled to a self-defense jury instruction, the unpreserved objection does not survive scrutiny
under the plain error or prejudicial impact reviews.
Finally, the Court addressed Guidry’s complaint of prosecutorial misconduct in
mischaracterizing the evidence in his opening and rebuttal closing statements. Defense counsel
objected to the assertions in his opening statement and to overcome the objection, the prosecutor
assured the Court that he was only previewing what the State’s evidence would show. Despite the
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assurance, the evidence to support several of his assertions was never presented. The Court held
that despite the misconduct, the evidence supported the conviction for the remaining offenses and
thus, was harmless-error14, not warranting reversal. Guidry raised several additional unpreserved
objections that the Court considered undeveloped and insufficient to support her prayer for
additional relief from her convictions.

Conclusion
The court held that even under plain-error review, the jury instruction relating to the murder charge
was a plain and clear error that impacted the substantial rights of the appellant since they were not
sufficiently clear as to communicate the requirement for finding malice. Thus, they reversed the
conviction for second-degree murder. The Court additionally held that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for findings of robbery and larceny and that there was not sufficient evidence to negate
the reasonableness of a finding of guilt on these convictions under the circumstances. The Court
rejected the argument that convictions of both robbery and larceny constituted Double jeopardy,
citing the distinctions between the two charges as not triggering the Double Jeopardy protections.
The court additionally held that having failed to preserve issues related to the self-defense
instruction for appeal, the evidence was insufficient to disturb the jury’s decision on the charges
of robbery and leaving the scene. While the court agreed that there was prosecutorial misconduct
in the mischaracterization of the evidence, the evidence presented was insufficient to undermine
the additional convictions. On these grounds, they upheld the remaining convictions. The Court,
acknowledging the cumulative nature of sentencing, vacated the sentences on the remaining
charges and remanded them for reconsideration.
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